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Abstract. The paper presents an innovative solution in
the field of RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentification) smart-
card authentication. Currently the smartcards are used for
many purposes - e.g. employee identification, library cards,
student cards or even identity credentials. Personal iden-
tity is revealed to untrustworthy entities every time we use
these cards. Such information could later be used without
our knowledge and for harmful reasons like shopping pat-
tern scanning or even movement tracking. We present a com-
munication scheme for keeping one’s identity private in this
paper. Although our system provides anonymity, it does not
allow users to abuse this feature. The system is based on
strong cryptographic primitives that provide features never
available before. Besides theoretical design of the anony-
mous authentication scheme and its analysis we also provide
implementation results.
Keywords
RFID, privacy, anonymity, cryptography, authentica-
tion, smartcards.
1. Current State Analysis
The authentication scheme presented in this paper is
designed to solve the problem of private data leak during
smartcard use. Currently we experience a heavy expansion
of varied smartcards and their use in an everyday life. We
use them automatically when we arrive to or leave work, buy
meals in canteens, shop in supermarkets or rent videos. It is
obvious that data about smartcard use are stored somewhere.
It would not be too difficult to find out our eating patterns,
shopping patterns or information about our movement if we
have a proper access to those data. What is more important
is that they could be used by companies to create even more
focused advertisement based on information about us. By
gathering of all our data we lose our privacy and our identity
could be misused in many ways. We can take many exam-
ples from [20], [21] to illustrate such a loss of privacy.
If we analyze the above mentioned services we may
realize that the identity revelation is not necessary in most
cases. The service provider needs to know that a client is an
allowed user (e.g. who paid some fee) but he does not have to
know the concrete identity until the service is abused. That
is a feature we provide in our scheme - the user will stay
anonymous during the service use as long as he adheres to
the rules.
For anonymous authentication we must be able to pro-
vide a protocol which will verify user’s eligibility to use the
service without his identity revelation. This could be done
by the verification of a group membership while the group
is the sum of all users allowed to use a service. The con-
cept of group signatures introduced in [7] can be used for
this task. If we are successful in creation of such a protocol
the service provider will be able to decide whether a client
is a member of the group of valid users but no more infor-
mation will be released about the user. But such a protocol
would be useless in practice because there would be no re-
sponsibility for one’s behavior as all users would be totally
anonymous. There must be a revelation mechanism to pro-
vide a tool for the identity revelation in the case of service
abuse. A similar mechanism is used for the detection of dou-
ble spenders in e-cash systems like [1]. We will adapt this
feature to our scheme to provide user responsibility.
For the smartcard environment the communication
must be very efficient to be usable in practice. Our scheme
works with a communication-computation tradeoff as most
of resource demanding calculations are run on computers
only. For the authentication phase itself we use primitive
calculations done by a .NET programmable smartcard. Such
a tradeoff was possible thank to the use of very efficient yet
cryptographically secure Σ-protocols.
1.1 Related Work
Our goal is to provide a solution to the problem of user
privacy because we are convinced that there are no practi-
cal smartcard anonymous authentication systems available
to this date. Nevertheless there are some concepts used in
computer networks which can be taken as a starting point.
The most promising ones are group signatures, e-cash sys-
tems and credential systems.
Group signature schemes were introduced in [7] to pre-
serve signer’s anonymity in a similar way as our anonymous
authentication scheme does. In practice there is a verifiable
group signature made by a user belonging to an established
group but the signer’s identity remains hidden until the revo-
cation is needed. In that case a trusted revocation manager
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is called to ”open” the signature and reveal the signer. There
has been an intensive research in the area of group signa-
tures. The first schemes were practically inefficient as sig-
natures were too long and dependent on a group size. The
more advanced ones like [6] improved the efficiency but still
remained off the practical use. In a recent time very efficient
schemes were published [13], [10]. Some recent group sig-
natures [12], [15], [23] also address the problem of spread
revocation. Those split the revocation manager into more
entities. Such a feature was also put to our solution. Nev-
ertheless only a minority of the above mentioned schemes
is usable in the smartcard environment which is very sensi-
tive to the right communication-computation tradeoff. That
is the reason why we designed our scheme with very limited
computations on a smartcard itself.
The offline e-cash systems [4], [5], [18] were analyzed
during the work on the authentication system published in
this article. The attractive property of a double spender de-
tection was adapted to revoke unwanted users in our scheme.
The core of an authentication protocol has been adapted from
Brand’s e-cash scheme [1] which is very efficient.
The last group of the related systems is represented
by credential systems. The most advanced scheme to our
knowledge [3] was examined to find similar properties. The
purpose of our scheme is different (we need only authenti-
cation without the work with credentials) and the scheme is
more robust and complex as well as lacking some important
features. For our purpose the identity spread revelation (and
revocation) is necessary for the service to be practically us-
able. We find such a feature almost missing in credential
systems.
We also analyzed already published anonymous au-
thentication systems with functionality similar to our
scheme. Schemes [19], [16] are not usable for our purpose
because of the need for trusted HW, scheme [2] works with
tags only. Other schemes like [14] need a trusted third party
to be able to reveal user’s identity.
1.2 Our Contribution
The anonymous authentication scheme presented in
this paper was specifically designed to be used in a smartcard
environment. That is the reason why all resource demand-
ing computations are done on the computer side preserving
smartcard resources. We used a tradeoff to pre-compute all
necessary values to make the authentication phase fast and
efficient. The scheme still fulfills all security requirements as
it provides user anonymity, exculpability, no-framing, sound
and complete authentication, user responsibility and revoca-
tion with tracing if needed.
In contrast to many schemes, our system works without
any trusted entity/HW and is completely independent on the
user group size. The only parameter determining the amount
of communication data is the security parameter.
2. Requirements
We already identified some basic scheme requirements
in the previous chapter. We make these demands more for-
mal in this section. We can adapt requirements for group
signatures stated in [17] as they serve a very similar purpose
on the computer network platform:
1. Soundness and Completeness: valid users are always
accepted to use a service while invalid ones are always
rejected.
2. Anonymity: no one can learn the identity of a user
based on the authentication information released by the
protocol (until system rules are broken).
3. Spread Traceability: there must be a way to reveal user
identity based on authentication information released
by the protocol but only if rules are broken by that user.
Such an identity revelation cannot be done by a single
entity but only by joint cooperation of exactly specified
entities.
4. No Framing: no-one (not even all other valid users)
can forge false authentication information which would
frame a user for a non-existing service use.
By the implementation of these requirements we get
a scheme which allows only valid users to use the service
and denies the rest (Requirement 1). Even if all communi-
cation data leak to the advertiser the user will stay private
and anonymous. No more information other than eligibility
to use the service will be leaked. Even the service provider
is unable to identify the user (Requirement 2). We prevent
users to abuse their anonymity by the Requirement 3 because
any user who broke the system rules would be uniquely de-
termined. We also prevent users to falsely frame other valid
users by the Requirement 4.
3. Scheme Design
The communication pattern is given by four entities in-
volved in the authentication process. We expect a client who
wants to use a service, an Authentication Server (AS) which
manages valid users, an access device which accepts/denies
users to use the service and finally a Public Authority (PA)
which is used for disputes. The principle is based on tokens
which are used as tickets for services. The user who has a
valid token and knows its construction is allowed to use the
service. The token is created by the user based on informa-
tion given by both AS and PA. The communication pattern
is depicted in Fig. 1.
Before we present the anonymous authentication
scheme in detail we must introduce some cryptographic
primitives. All of them are the outcomes of modern cryptog-
raphy and altogether they create a unique core which allows
us to fulfill all requirements stated in Section 2.
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Fig. 1. The communication pattern of the scheme.
3.1 Used Cryptographic Primitives
Σ-protocols
The Σ-protocols (or Sigma-protocols) [8] are prod-
ucts of modern cryptography which can be used as build-
ing blocks for many purposes. Nevertheless they are used
as proofs between a Prover (P) and a Verifier (V) in most
common scenarios. We have chosen these protocols because
of their effectiveness and security. For the Σ-protocol to be
formerly correct these requirements must be fulfilled:
• 3-way pattern: there are 3 messages sent. The first
one goes from the Prover to the Verifier , the second
vice versa and the last one again from the Prover to
the Verifier. Besides these messages some environment
must be set (generators g1,g2 and a cyclic multiplica-
tive group in our case).
• Completeness: an honest Prover must be always suc-
cessful (i.e. accepted by V).
• Special Soundness: a cheating Prover must be able to
answer at most one challenge in the protocol.
• HVSZK (Honest Verifier Special Zero-Knowledge):
the protocol releases no extra (unintended) information
from its run with an honest Verifier.
We stated these requirements in a very informal way
which is sufficient for our purpose but a detailed specifica-
tion could be found e.g. here [9]. The Schnorr protocol [22]
is q practical example of the Σ-protocol. We have chosen
this protocol because of its effectiveness (it could be used
for a computation-communication tradeoff) and flexibility.
Proof of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm
Schnorr’s protocol can be used as the Proof of Knowl-
edge of Discrete Logarithm (PKDL) where the Prover proves
to the Verifier that he knows a certain discrete logarithm
without its revelation. The Verifier learns only whether the
Prover knows the discrete log or not; nothing else from this
protocol.
The protocol works with the subgroup Zp of the cyclic
multiplicative group Zn where n is a secure prime modu-
lus, p a high prime divisor of n− 1 and g an element of
order p in Zn. These variables are pre-shared to entities be-
fore an actual use. The Prover knows a secret exponent w
(which works as a private identity key because it is not re-
leased by the protocol to anyone, V included). P chooses
r ∈R Zp and sends c = gw mod n,a = gr mod n in the first
move. V replies with a random challenge e ∈R Zp. The Ver-
ifier accepts P if he is able to send the answer of the form
z = ew + r mod p as the last move. This is checked by V
by the evaluation of the equation gz ≡ ace (mod n). It can
be formally shown that this protocol fulfills all requirements
for a Σ-protocol. We can use it to prove the knowledge of a
secret key without exposing it to anyone. Even more, we can
use it to convince someone that we made computations cor-
rectly and that we used the key inside further constructions.
The communication is illustrated by Fig. 2.
Prover Verifier
g,n
c = gw mod n
a = gr mod n
c,a−−−−−−−−−−−→
e ∈R Zp←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
z = (ew+ r) mod p
z−−−−−−−−−−→
Check:
gz ≡ ace (mod n)
Fig. 2. Proof of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm.
Prover Verifier
g,n
c1 = gw1 mod n
c2 = gw2 mod n
a1 = gr1 mod n
a2 = gr2 mod n
c1,c2,a1,a2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
e ∈R Zp←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
z = (ew+ r) mod p
z−−−−−−−−−−→
Check:
gz1 ≡ a1ce1 (mod n)
gz2 ≡ a2ce2 (mod n)
Fig. 3. Proof of Discrete Logarithm Equivalence.
Proof of Discrete Logarithm Equivalence
The second use of the protocol is the Proof of Discrete
Logarithm Equivalence (PDLE). We can prove the construc-
tion of two numbers c1,c2 which were created by the expo-
nentiation of different roots by the same exponent in mod n.
This exponent is not revealed during the run of the protocol.
The protocol works in a very similar fashion as the PKDL -
see Fig. 3.
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We can run this protocol also non-interactively (NIP-
DLE) by choosing the challenge e as a hash of values c and
a. With these primitives we can build the scheme now.
3.2 Anonymous Authentication Scheme
Our authentication scheme is divided into two phases -
registration and authentication. The user pays for the service
and registers at AS during the registration phase. AS then
provides the user with partial information needed to create
an authentication token. With this information the user must
contact PA which provides the rest needed for a valid token
creation. The registration phase is run only through com-
puter networks and could be run as many times as necessary
(to get as many tokens as necessary). As soon as the user has
the desired number of authentication tokens he can transfer
them from the computer to his smartcard. The authentication
phase follows. The whole authentication phase runs between
the smartcard and an access device, no communication with
client computer is necessary. The scheme is illustrated in
Fig. 4.
IDU, SigU(nonce,  commitment)
 SigAS(commitment)
Token, NIPDLE, SigAS(commitment)
PKDL
SigPA(Token | IDAS)
Token, SigPA(Token | IDAS)
PKDL
nonce
Verify&Store SigU(nonce, 
commitment)
SMARTCARD
Token, 
SigPA(Token 
| IDAS)
NIPDLE: Non-Interactive 
Proof of Discrete 
Logarithm Equivalency
Token: First move of 
Proof of Knowledge of 
Discrete Logarithm
NIPDLE verification
PKDL verification&store
SigAS(commitment) 
verification
PKDL verification&store
SigPA(Token|IDAS) 
verification
Registration phase
Authentication 
phase
Public Authority 
(SkPA, PkPA)
Client
(SkC, PkC)
Authentication Server
(SkAS, PkAS)
Access Control 
Device
Fig. 4. Authentication scheme.
Registration Phase
The purpose of this phase is to create a token usable for
authentication. The token is a construction which must in-
clude user identity but only in a hidden form inaccessible by
anyone but the user. The construction must release the iden-
tity in the case of rule breaking. We use the first step (values
c and a) of the above mentioned PKDL protocol as the token
because the protocol can work for identity hiding (identity is
used as a secret exponent) as well as for authentication (only
valid users know the exponent). We will also use the feature
of Σ-protocols - they release the secret exponent in the case
of multiple runs. The registration phase works as depicted in
Fig. 4.
All entities have public cryptography keypairs (Pk, Sk).
The environment (safe prime modulus n for the group, p for
the subgroup and g1,g2 for its generators) is preshared. The
client contacts AS with a request for service use through a se-
cure channel (e.g. Secure Socket Layer, SSL). AS replies
with a random challenge nonce. The client signs the concate-
nation (marked as |) of the nonce and a commitment of the
form commitment = grand2 mod n, where the rand is a secret
value chosen by the client. The signature is sent to AS which
replies with its signature on the commitment. As a result the
client committed to the value rand and received a signature
on that commitment so he must use the value in future steps
because PA will demand the AS signature. We use standard
RSA signatures in our implementation. The rand value is
crucial for security so it cannot be released by the client any-
where.
The client creates the token with the generator g1 and
the rand value as a secret exponent. The token is of the
form C = grand1 mod n, A = g
a
1 mod n where a is a random
number ∈R Zp. Client also creates NIPDLE between C and
commitment to be able to prove the correct construction of
the token to PA (he needs to convince PA that the exponent
in the commitment and the token is the same one).
The client anonymously sends the token and the en-
crypted proof of its construction to PA using anonymous
routing (e.g. [11]). PA verifies the construction and runs
the PKDL protocol with an encrypted response z to find out
whether the client knows the secret rand. The PKDL run
is stored for future disputes as it can be used for an iden-
tity revelation. If everything is fine, PA signs the token and
sends the signature to the client. This signature certifies that
the token is of a correct form and that it was firstly spent
at PA (Σ-protocol was run there). Now the token and PA’s
signature on it can be transferred to the smartcard. The au-
thentication phase follows.
Authentication Phase
The authentication phase is a simple PKDL protocol
with an encrypted response z. The access control device ver-
ifies PA’s signature. If the signature is fine the device is con-
vinced that the token is of a correct form and that it was used
once before. If the PKDL protocol runs fine the client is
accepted for the service use.
Disputes
In the case of rule breaking the token owner identity
must be revealed. This could be done by the cooperation
of PA and AS, because a Σ-protocol was run with both of
these entities. It comes from the very basic property of the Σ-
protocol that the secret exponent rand can be revealed from
2 different protocol runs. The rand computation is based
on (1), where values without comma come from the PKDL
with PA and values with comma come from the authentica-
tion phase PKDL with an access control device.
rand =
z− z′
e− e′ mod n. (1)
Such a revelation is only available if PA and AS coop-
erate and because PA should be an authority driven e.g. by
a state or court there is an assumption that service providers
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are not able to break user anonymity unless they have a solid
evidence for rule breaking. In addition no entity (not even
PA) at all is able to abuse its rights to break user anonymity
alone.
4. Scheme Analysis
The two key requirements for the scheme were secu-
rity and efficiency. We provide analysis of these areas in this
section.
4.1 Security Analysis
We discuss all the requirements stated in Section 2
here:
1. Soundness and Completeness: authentication is suc-
cessful only if the PKDL protocol in the authentica-
tion phase is accepted. That is why the Soundness and
Completeness come directly from the Σ-protocols used
as the building blocks. The only entity knowing a valid
rand is a valid user. Others know only a commitment
to it which cannot be used for a rand extraction under
the Discrete Logarithm problem assumption.
2. Anonymity: the identity is hidden in the token in the
form of commitment which is unbreakable under the
Discrete Logarithm assumption. The attacker would be
successful if he was able to compute w = logg c in the
chosen group which is considered to be hard for big
numbers (comparable to e.g. RSA implementation).
Σ-protocols release no extra information based on the
HVSZK property.
3. Spread Traceability: the identity can be revealed from
the token but only if PA and AS cooperate. This fea-
ture works thanks to the Special Soundness property
of Σ-protocols. The property guarantees that the secret
exponent, which contains the user identity, is opened in
the case of at least two protocol runs.
4. No Framing: the user commits to a secret, unique rand
value in the registration phase. As he is the only one
knowing that value, no one else can frame him by us-
ing it. The rand value should be therefore unique and
never re-used.
4.2 Efficiency Analysis
The whole scheme is divided into two parts. The first
one (registration) is run in a computer network among com-
puters. Efficient 3-way protocols are used and computations
are done locally. The second phase (authentication) runs
between a smartcard and an access device. The tokens are
stored in a smartcard memory. With an average card mem-
ory ( 100kB) hundreds of tokens can be stored at once. This
phase requires only one multiplication and addition on the
card side which we consider to be efficient. This state is
achieved thank to the communication-computation tradeoff.
The authentication phase involves only 3 messages between
sender’s card and an access control device. That is why
we find the scheme usable with RFID cards which do not
provide as secure and reliable communication interface as
standard contact cards do. In comparison to most of other
schemes our solution is independent on a user group size.
4.3 Implementation
The scheme presented in this paper has been imple-
mented in a testing .NET environment (see Figure 5). Al-
though it works only as a proof of concept it certifies to the
possibility of a real-world implementation which is our next
goal. We expect to use .NET smartcards on the client side
as also all other entities are built in .NET. The implementa-
tion allows anonymous authentication of the client entity by
the authentication server entity. A newly introduced public
authority entity has been also implemented to gather infor-
mation needed for further malicious user revelations. The
software allows to choose the order of the group used by
cryptographic primitives. You can see all three key entities
(Client, Authentication Server and Public Authority) imple-
mented in Fig. 5. The server and client windows are trimmed
due to readability.
(a) The Public Authority
(b) The Authentication Client and Server
Fig. 5. The testing implementation of the scheme.
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5. Conclusion and Future Plans
We presented an anonymous authentication scheme
for RFID smartcards in this paper. Our system provides
anonymity for electronic device users as well as detection
of malicious users for service providers. As a result the sys-
tem can be used by both users requiring privacy and service
providers requiring user responsibility. There is no need for
a trusted entity or trusted HW in the scheme so it could
be used in environments without trust. The cryptographic
core is based on established primitives like Σ-protocols, one-
time signatures and RSA signatures therefore security of the
scheme could be easily verified.
According to future plans we would like to improve
the zero-knowledge property. Although we provide security
thanks to the Σ-protocol with an encrypted response there is
probably a better way as the family of Σ-protocols can be ef-
ficiently converted [9] to Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowl-
edge. We would like to use this feature to create a scheme
with even stronger security assumptions.
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